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Ludger Kühnhardt 
The New Silk Road: The European 
Union, China and Lessons Learned 
I.  
On its way to become a global power, the European Union is facing the 
claim to global power status by others, especially China. While the 
European Union is incrementally expanding its presence, scope of action 
and the underlying strategic objectives, China is dynamically filling the gap 
that always existed between the country’s formal global status and its 
factual content.  
On June 28, 2016, the first ever “Global Strategy” of the EU has been 
published, defining “principled pragmatism” as the EU’s policy method.1 
The EU tries to turn its long-standing claim of being a normative power 
into a cautious and realistic set of policy preferences combining its 
traditional multilateral creed with a more robust assessment of hard power 
necessities. China, in turn, has been a member of the United Nations 
Security Council since 1949 and one of the great powers of the world. As 
consequence of its exceptional socio-economic transformation since the 
late 1970s, China is increasingly projecting its global presence to confirm 
its role as a big power contributing to stability and development around the 
globe. In doing so, China wants to realize the doctrine of its Head of State 
 
1 European Union, Global Strategy (2016), online at: https:// europa.eu/ 
globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union. 
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and Communist Party Chairman, Xi Jingping: “A Community of Common 
destiny” for all mankind.2  
The “Belt and Road Initiative”, Xi’s signature foreign policy project, 
launched in 2013 and ever since evolving conceptually, in content and 
objective, embraces 65 countries in Asia, Africa and Europa. The “Belt and 
Road Initiative”, a unilateral Chinese initiative, sees China in the service of 
a wide set of network-based partnerships. It claims to be a pragmatic 
alternative to alliance formations, yet recognizing different power centers 
in the world. It claims equal treatment of partners while simultaneously 
trying to reconfigure power relations in the world. This approach – with a 
definite undercurrent of challenging US global hegemony – is not without 
contradictions. Yet, the “Belt and Road Initiative” has to be taken seriously 
in itself.  
In many ways, it encounters the European Union: conceptually, 
economically and culturally, in terms of policy preferences and regional 
self-images. The European Union needs to develop a pro-active position 
toward the “Belt and Road Initiative”. Moreover, it has to develop a pro-
active strategy to engage with China on the “Belt and Road Initiative”. This 
engagement with China cannot be done, and will not be done, as substitute 
for Europe’s indispensable ties with the United States, as some in China 
may hope for. Rather, the EU and China would be advised to advance a 
global triangular agenda of leadership with the United States. On all 
possible accounts, mistrust is still looming large as the biggest obstacle to 
do so. Time has come to search for clarification and a reasoning that 
supports trust, the most precious resource in international relations. 
The sources of mistrust between the European Union and China in the 
context of the “Belt and Road Initiative” begin with different expectations, 
inconsistent perceptions and, most importantly, lack of clarity about 
semantics and concepts. Squaring the circle seems to be the most rewarding 
 
2  See Xi’s world vision: a community of common destiny, a shared home for 
humanity, in: CCTV.com, January 15, 2017, online at: http://english. cctv.com/ 
2017/ 01/15/ARTIjfECMGRxn4TrlI0UqAcl170115.shtml. 
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hope to overcome conceptual dissent. Yet, more than once this method 
remains limited. Hence, an honest confrontation and possible clarification 
of conceptual dissonance is the better recommendation for a better 
beginning between the European Union, the United States and China – not 
the least on matters related to the “Belt and Road Initiative”.  
As the “Belt and Road Initiative” is a Chinese project, China has to clarify 
matters related to the scope and objectives of the “Belt and Road 
Initiative”. It begins with semantics: Is the “Belt and Road Initiative” an 
invitation to genuine economic cooperation or is it a national Chinese 
strategy to advance geo-economic and geo-political objectives?  
The “Belt and Road Initiative” has been perceived as response to former 
US President Obama’s policy announcement of an US “Pivot to Asia”. 
Suspicion about the “Belt and Road Initiative” as an instrument of Chinese 
power projection has accompanied the project ever since, not the least since 
the Trump administration has taken center stage in Washington. 3 
Competing geopolitical claims to hegemony however, is not a favorable 
constellation to sooth mistrust in Europe. It is China herself who has to 
clarify whether or not the “Belt and Road Initiative” is an instrument to 
replace existing functional elements of the current global order, including 
the connectivity programs (i.e. in the field of logistics or transnational 
border crossings) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.  
Beyond political mistrust in Europe about the objectives of the “Belt and 
Road Initiative”, and especially its “Balkan Silk Road” leg, a thorough 
academic clarification is indispensable: It relates to the very concept of 
region-building. 4  Chinese analysts understand the “Belt and Road 
Initiative” as a contribution to an externally induced regionalism. They 
assume a positive effect of China’s initiative on the promotion of regional 
 
3  See the plea for a constructive engagement of the US with China: Ziad Haider, Can 
the U.S. Pivot Back to Asia?: How Trump Should Respond to China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative, in: Foreign Affairs, May 23, 2017, online at: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-05-23/can-us-pivot-back-asia. 
4  See Ludger Kühnhardt, Region-Building: The global proliferation of regional 
integration, Oxford/New York: Berghahn, 2010.  
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cooperation and integration elsewhere. This assumption is questionable:  
Nowhere, neither in the EU, in Central Asia, in Africa or in the Balkans, 
will regional integration work if not owned by the respective local states 
and societies. Moreover, overlapping regional groupings will almost 
inevitably face contradictory effects (i.e. on external tariffs or on policy 
preferences). Here is a serious field for consultation between the European 
Union and China in order to clarify conceptual dissonances and 
misunderstandings.  
Up until now, the “Belt and Road Initiative” has triggered mixed reactions 
in the European Union. The emerging or already ongoing European 
participation in the “Belt and Road Initiative”, including the railway 
transportation hub between Duisburg, Germany, and Chongqing, China, is 
not echoed by a focused conceptual engagement in the EU. Fear and 
mistrust seem to prevail, but a belated sense of strategy on the EU side is 
also evident. Critical remarks about possible Chinese intentions to split the 
EU or to promote a decoupling of the EU from its transatlantic partnership 
with the United States and Canada (representing 40 percent of global trade) 
dominate media coverage. Minimizing the future political influence by 
China seems to be the unspoken political attitude, if there is any. The more 
fundamental problem of the European Union is the lamentable fact that 
China has a far-reaching strategy while the European Union has none to 
respond to and engage with the “Belt and Silk Road Initiative”.   
To address the double trust deficit on the “Belt and Road Initiative “– 
China not being unequivocally clear in its intentions, the European Union 
remaining ambivalent in its attitude – honesty may help to clarify matters. 
In light of the matured partnership between the EU and China, an honest 
stock-taking is possible and necessary. Often, the “Belt and Road 
Initiative” is understood as the “New Silk Road”. This sounds somewhat 
romantic. 5  It opens avenues for a comparative look at experiences and 
 
5  See Jean-Pierre Drège, Seidenstrasse, Zurich: Silva, 1993; Colin Thubron, Shadow 
of the Silk Road, London: Vintage Books, 2007; Xinru Liu, The Silk Road in 
World History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010; Valerie Hansen, The Silk 
Road: A New History, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
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lessons learned. This paper suggests five lessons that can be learned by 
comparing the ancient and medieval Silk road with the potential of the Belt 
and road Initiative” to become a win-win-win project for the EU-China-US 
triangle, the main pillars of the emerging multilateral global order.  
II.  
The first lesson learned from the experience with the historic “Silk Road”: 
Geopolitics matters and has not been irrelevant at any time. Already the 
original label Silk Road went beyond a romantic assessment of the 
Eurasian landmass. German Geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen, 
professor at Bonn University between 1875 and 1883, created the term 
“Silk Road” after expeditions to explore Chinese coal resources in the hope 
to bring them under imperial German influence. 6  Halford Mackinder’s 
“Heartland”-theory of 1904 has never lost attention, understanding Eurasia 
as the “pivot of history”.7 The 19th century “Great Game” between imperial 
Russia and imperial Great Britain involved in particular ways Xinjiang 
(Kashgar) and Tibet (Lhasa).8 Against this background it is not surprising 
that the contemporary Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative” triggered fear in 
the West of a return of its own geopolitical past. China assuages such fear 
by claiming in President Xi’s words during the 2017 “Silk Road Forum” in 
Beijing that China will not engage in “games between foes”. 9  Such a 
perspective, of course, does not exclude geopolitical intentions.  
The European Union is taking note of Japanese and Indian efforts to 
counter China’s belt and road expansion, thus confirming suspicion of a 
new geopolitical race. The 12th Japan-India Summit in September 2017 
 
6  See the reprint of his original diaries: Ferdinand von Richthofen’s Tagebücher, Aus 
China, Neuilly-sur-Seine: Ulan Press, 2012. 
7  See the reprint: Halford J. Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History, in: Idem, 
Democratic Ideals and Reality, Washington, DC: National Defense University 
Press, 1996, pp. 175–193. 
8  Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, London: 
John Murray, 1990. 
9  Cited in: Neil Connor, Hammond says Brexit Britain must back China’s new Silk 
Road, in: The Telegraph, May 14, 2017, online at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
news/2017/05/14/hammond-says-brexit-britain-must-back-chinas-new-silk-road/. 
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ended with a commitment of Japan to finance a speed train between 
Bombay and Ahmedabad and with the joint creation of an “Asian-African 
Growth Corridor”. India is already the fifth investor in Africa, while Japan 
announced a $200 bio additional investment in Africa on top of the existing 
$32 bio Japanese investment in the continent. 10  Such geo-economic 
counter-measures by third parties naturally raise questions in the EU about 
the geopolitical nature of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”.  
It is in the interest of the European Union to assess the effect of the “Belt 
and Road Initiative” on the balance between regional and global trends. In 
the meantime, the EU has finalized or is about to finalize Free Trade 
Agreements with all those Asia-Pacific countries which belong to the failed 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, buried on the first day of President Trump’s 
work in the White House in January 2017. China, on the other hand, has 
risen to be the biggest investor in the ASEAN region. As long-standing 
partner of ASEAN, the EU sees the importance to clarify the relationship 
between ASEAN’s objective of consolidating its own ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) and ASEAN’s relationship with the China-driven 
“Regional Comprehension Economic Partnership” (RCEP). While the US 
is receding from its Asia-Pacific role, the EU and China need to improve 
their presence and possible conflicts of aims in the ASEAN region. 
Otherwise, geo-economic interests may easily translate into a new geo-
political rivalry there.  
The lesson learned from experiences of the original Silk Road is evident: 
reliability and predictability grow if all partners explain their genuine 
interests as transparent as possible. The European Union and China should 
engage – among themselves but also with the US and other interested 
parties – in a conceptual dialogue: Can the “Belt and Road Initiative” 
support multilateralism or does it merely serve a multipolar global order? 
How can the “Belt and Road Initiative” become a positive trigger to 
 
10  Cf. Africa-Asian Growth corridor launched, in: Times of India, May 25, 2017, 
online at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/asia-africa-growth-
corridor-launched/articleshow/58830900.cms; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
Japan-India Summit Meeting, September 14, 2017, online at: http:// 
www.mofa.go.jp/ s_sa/sw/in/page3e_000747.html. 
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overcome suspicion about not being more than a unilateral Chinese 
instrument of power projection by geo-economic means? Up until now, the 
European Union is no formal partner to the “Belt and Road Initiative”. The 
rejection of the Final Communique of the “Silk Road Forum” in Beijing in 
May 2017 by all EU member state delegations present (including from 
Germany, France, and Great Britain) demonstrated ongoing suspicion 
about incompatible trade interests.11 The EU and its member states consider 
the Shanghai-based “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank” (AIIB) as a 
welcomed tool for global partnerships in economic diplomacy. 12  Yet, 
clarifications remain necessary about the AIIB role in the “Belt and Road 
Initiative”. Moreover, Chinese objectives under the banner of “Made in 
China 2025” and the “China Dream” project linked to the 2049 centenary 
of the People’s Republic of China require a more intensive dialogue with 
Europe, the US and other international actors.13 This alone, however, is not 
good enough: The EU itself needs to embrace more forward-looking 
ambitions to better project its own potential for economic diplomacy in 
Asia and Africa. In the absence of a genuine “European Dream”, the EU 
often is trapped between its own myopic approach and complaints about 
China’s dynamic drive. A more proactive engagement with China on the 
geopolitical and geo-economic dimension of the “Belt and Road Initiative” 
demands from Europe a much more global psychology and perspective. 
Remaining unclear about its own ambition and staying on the sidelines 
does not serve the EU. China’s perception of a timid, too often re-active 
and over-cautious Europe is not helpful either. No less than in the 19th and 
20th century, perceptions are realities in the 21st century global age.  
 
 
11  EU backs away from trade statement in blow to China’s ‘modern Silk Road’ plan, 
in: The Guardian, May 15, 2017, online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2017/may/15/eu-china-summit-bejing-xi-jinping-belt-and-road. 
12  Vasilis Trigkas, The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: A Win-Win for China-
EU Relations, in: CarnegieTsinghua Center for Global Policy, June 16, 2015, 
online at: carnegietsinghua.org/2015/06/16/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-
win-win-for-china-eu-relations-pub-60383. 
13  See Eva Pejsova, China futures: Horizon 2025, Paris: European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, 2017. 
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III. 
The second lesson learned from the experience with the historic “Silk 
Road”: The trade potential along the Silk Road is irresistible but it requires 
reciprocity to alleviate existing trust deficits. Since Chinese silk reached 
Rome via India and Arabia in the first century and opaque glasses from the 
Roman Empire reached China, economic and social concern existed on 
both end of the Silk Road in parallel to the reciprocal fascination. In his 
“Annals” Tacitus described Roman fear in the 2nd century: too much silk 
garments used even by men would increase decadence. Today, Europe is 
concerned about Chinese-made robots and too much investment from 
China. Problems of copyright are not new either: While today, Europe 
laments the fact that sixty percent of faked goods imported into the EU 
originate in China, it should not be forgotten that in the early days of the 
Silk Road the printing of books and the knowledge of black powder 
reached Europe via obscure ways. As for knowledge-transfer of the silk 
production in the early days of the Silk Road, it is fair to talk of India, 
Turkey and Greece as cocoon copy-cats.  
Today, the first matter of dispute about an imbalanced relation between the 
EU and China concerns Chinese investment into the EU. In 2016, €35 bio 
Chinese investment has reached the EU, similar to the aggregated Chinese 
direct investment into the EU between 2006 and 2016. 14  The EU 
investment in China has declined consistently over past years. This 
satiation confronts the EU with a substantial policy alternative: Some focus 
critically on China’s dynamic outbound investment pattern and advocate 
investment control in fear of a growing strategic influence of China. Others 
favor an open door policy for the EU which is likewise benefitting from 
access to markets elsewhere. Indeed, the EU needs to balance its approach 
to this situation. While it claims to promote open global trade, it must 
recognize that Chinese FDI is a driver of growth in the EU. The European 
market, still on its road to a sustained recovery after the dire years of crises, 
has all reason to welcome Chinese and other FDI. On the other hand, the 
 
14  MERICS (Mercator Institute for China Studies), Chinese Investment in Europe, 
2017, online at: https://www.merics.org/en/tags/chinese-investment-in-europe/. 
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EU, like any other player in the global economy, is entitled to protect 
strategic interests from uncontrolled external acquisition.  
In his “State of the Union Address” on September 13, 2017, EU 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker announced a new framework 
for investment screening.15 Juncker’s statement (“we are not naïve traders”) 
was understood primarily as anti-Chinese. This perspective would be a 
simplification. WTO regulations hinder already wild FDI takeover policies 
in the global economy whenever “national interests” are at stake. 13 of the 
28 EU member states have promulgated national investment screening 
measures. Juncker’s initiative shall bring regulatory consistency to the 
Single Market. It is indeed an inacceptable contradiction, if a Chinese (or 
any other non-EU) buyer would try to purchase, let’s say, German 
technology via buying a Portuguese outlet of a particular German company. 
The EU has good reason to eliminate contradictions that may arise between 
its own competition policy and possible national interests of member states. 
The quest for internal coherence in regulatory governance across the whole 
of the EU is more than a vulgar cover-up for an anti-Chinese initiative. 
Should China see it this ways, there is only one logical recommendation for 
both sides: The EU needs to better engage China more in explaining 
European regulatory governance – also in the interest of being predictable 
and reliable to its external partners, China including. China, in turn, should 
be encouraged to do the utmost in enhancing transparency in the 
relationship between market initiatives of its private companies on the one 
hand and state interests related to national banks granting credits to private 
and public enterprises on the other hand. Trust is a currency which can be 
expanded with good will and honesty.    
  
 
15  Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union speech, annotated, in: Financial Times, 
September 13, 2017, online at: https://ig.ft.com/juncker-speech-annotated/. 
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IV. 
The third lesson learned from the experience with the historic “Silk Road”: 
Optimizing trade potential is in the interest of all but in order to achieve its 
potential joint EU-China regulatory governance initiatives are required in 
third countries. 
The omnipresent lack of knowledge about each other was a continuous 
source of mistakes in the times of the original Silk Road. The false views of 
China in Pliny’s “Natural History” or in Strabo’s “Geography” were as 
notorious as the strange labelling of the Romans as “Da Qin” (= big Qin) 
by the Chinese of the Han dynasty who saw themselves as “Qin”. In both 
directions, the Pamir Mountains were a natural border for real encounter of 
China and Europe. The publication of Francesco Pegolottis “La Pratica 
della Mercatura”, a handbook on production patterns in China, published in 
1340 showed a better and still relevant direction: Regulatory manuals along 
the “Belt and Road Initiative”, touching after all on 65 countries, will be of 
the essence.  
The EU-China “Connectivity platform” is a first step to make better use of 
functional procedures and regulations. They are meant to improve trans-
national border crossings and related logistical issues. 16  But regulatory 
cooperation ought to go beyond this EU-China initiative. In each country 
and between all countries along the “Belt and Road Initiative” huge socio-
economic asymmetries exist. Environmental issues, labor conditions, 
matters of energy, water supply or road construction, but likewise matters 
of compliance and accountable governance impact sustainable 
achievements in any “Belt and Road Initiative”-related project. Joint EU-
China activities to stabilize Central Asia and Africa could genuinely be in 
the service of the weakest along the Belt and Road Initiative. If done well, 
those initiatives could be transformative by turning the existing trust deficit 
 
16  On the current state: European Commission, EU-China Summit: moving forward 
with our global partnership, June 2, 2017, online at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-1524_en.htm; Sebastian Schiek, Bewegung auf der Seidenstraße. 
Chinas „Belt and Road“-Initiative als Anreiz für zwischenstaatliche Kooperation an 
Zentralasiens Grenzen, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2017. 
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into a more reliable EU-Chinese partnership. Intensified and pro-active 
cooperation with EU-based regulatory agencies, the key players of 
successfully implementing the Single Market, and academic regulatory 
experts can be a game-changer in many places along the “Belt and Road 
Initiative”.17  
Cooperation in regulatory governance would facilitate a more open and 
constructive discussion between the EU and China on matters of 
transparency, standards and norms, and, more principled, on the limits of 
the debt-given growth model underlying the development model of the 
“Belt and Road Initiative”. Backlashes as China has faced them in Sri 
Lanka and in several African countries point to the usefulness of comparing 
notes with the EU on matters of regulatory governance and the very debt-
based growth system China is promoting.18 Regulatory governance, in the 
eyes of the EU, is more than a technical and functional exercise. 
Regulatory governance is at the root of what EU leaders mean when they 
advocate rule-based multilateralism.19 So far, neither the concept nor its 
purpose and usefulness have been incorporated in its fullest potential into 
EU-China relations. Obviously, there is a wide space for improvement in 
trust. While the EU is currently overhauling its Central Asia strategy (the 
original one dating back to 2007) the potential of regulatory cooperation 
with China in Central Asia should find high priority in the new Central 
Asian strategy.20 It is here where functional cooperation with Russia is also 
meaningful.  
 
 
17  See Christian Koenig/Bernhard von Wendland, The Art of Regulation: Wealth and 
Wariness,, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017. 
18  See Yogita Limaye, Sri Lanka: A country trapped in debt, BBC News, May 26, 
2017, online at: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-40044113. 
19  See Ludger Kühnhardt/Christian Koenig (eds.), Governance and Regulation in the 
European Union: A Reader, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017. 
20  On the current situation see: European Union External Action Service, The 
European Union and Central Asia: the new partnership in action, July 7, 2016, 
online at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/4890/the-
european-union-and-central-asia-the-new-partnership-in-action_en. 
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V. 
The fourth lesson learned from the experience with the historic “Silk 
Road”: Protectionism is bad for all and damage travels faster than all 
efforts to contain its negative effects. 
In the 14th century, the “Mongolian pest” reached Europe through fur trade. 
Its effects were disastrous. Fear of increased cooperation with China has 
extended to the possible spread of epidemics via bacteria that have come to 
Europe along with food and other goods from China. This, of course, is not 
a phenomenon related to interactions with China as European travelers 
import bacteria from all over the world. The challenge to cope with 
epidemics as a fallout of globalization should support more practical 
cooperation and consultation with any country and region in the world, 
China including. Issues of food security, health and hygiene standards are 
of the essence to enhance human security anywhere.  
Trust travels and mistrust travels even faster whenever the promotion of 
self-interest is perceived as an ambition unduly combined with 
protectionism. Negotiations for a comprehensive EU-China Investment 
Agreement started in 2013.21 Ongoing differences have prevented an early 
conclusion of these negotiations. It is regrettable that the investment dossier 
is decoupled from trade matters. Negotiations for an EU-China Free Trade 
Agreement are even less achievable in the near future. As long as this 
situation prevails, the “Belt and Road Initiative” will be accompanied by 
mistrust and dissonances. A particular serious case in point is the EU 
mistrust about China’s “16+1 Initiative” in Central and South Eastern 
Europe. 22  While the EU is recognizing, for instance, with sympathy 
China’s direct investment in Southeast Europe, complains are permanent 
 
21  For details see European Commission, DG Trade, China, online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/. 
22  See Jens Bastian, The potential for growth through Chinese infrastructure 
investments in Central and South-Eastern Europe along the “Balkan Silk Road”, 
London/Athens July 2017 and the related article by Vanora Bennett, What China’s 
“Belt and Road Initiative” means for the Western Balkans, September 11, 2017, 
online at: http://www.ebrd.com/news/2017/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-
means-for-the-western-balkans.html. 
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and rather mushrooming on the content of these investments. Issues in this 
regard touched on environmental standards in the establishment of a 
thermal power plant in Bosnia-Herzegovina, on transparency in 
procurement matters related to the Belgrade-Budapest railway project, and 
on the political influence ensuing from the investment of China’s company 
Cosco into the port of Piraeus. The suspicion on this issue was confirmed 
when Greece sidelined the usual EU consensus and rejected a UN Human 
Right Commission resolution on China, Greece’s biggest investor, on July 
17, 2017.23 China, in turn, is furious when blamed to pursue of policy of 
divide and rule by splitting of the EU with its “16+1 Initiative” (Balkan 
Silk Road). Separating trade from investment and remaining without a 
negotiated frame agreement on both fronts without mediation and 
arbitration mechanisms is guarantee for ongoing – and possibly mounting - 
disputes in this regard.  
The second dispute in the area of damage control relates to financial policy, 
especially to the Chinese protectionism of its capital markets. The EU 
constantly demands the comprehensive opening of China’s capital market. 
This request for reciprocity is more forward-looking and constructive than 
efforts to curb or limit China’s FDI’s in Europe. However, the process in 
China to open the country’s capital markets has certainly been too slow. In 
the meantime, it is evident that the trend in the Chinese position on these 
matters points to a Chinese self interest in further opening the country’s 
capital markets. In 2017, FDI into China has gone down by at least 6.5 
percent, a phenomenon not welcome by China and potentially undermining 
the effort to consolidate and improve its growth rates. A statement of the 
Vice-Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, Fang 
Xinghai, in September 2017 that it should be in China’s self-interest to 
open up the future market was a first good step welcomed in the EU.24 
Only a few days later, “China Finance Form 40”, a think tank, proposed 
 
23  See Nick Cumming-Bruce/Somini Singupta, In Greece, China Finds an Ally 
Against Human Rights Criticism, in: New York Times, June 19, 2017, online at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/world/europe/china-human-rights-greece-
united-nations.html. 
24 Meng Fanbin, Future to be opened up in: China Daily, September 18, 2017, p. 17.  
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publicly to substantially reduce restrictions on foreign investors in the self-
interest of China: The notorious ceiling of a 25 percent stake of foreign 
investors should fall in banks and securities companies. Domestic and 
foreign bond markets should be connected in better ways and the Chinese 
stock market should be opened for foreign investment, the think tank 
stated.25Of the essence is the direction taken by the new Governor of the 
People’s Bank of China.26  
How much this issue is about trust, can be seen when comparing the 
Chinese situation to that of its Northeast Asian neighbors. While the 
Chinese stock market includes a 5 percent foreign share, the Korean stock 
market includes a 30 percent foreign share. The Chinese bond market 
includes a 2 percent share, the Japanese bond market a 10.5 percent share.27 
The best way forward for Chinese-EU-economic relations – and hence for 
more trust in the Belt and Road Initiative too – would be a level playing 
field based on shared investment and trade principles. The systemic 
difference between China’s state-managed capitalism and the EU’s Single 
Market with strong regulatory governance market economy remains the 
structurally biggest, albeit not insurmountable wall between the EU and 
China. Where there is a will, there were always ways to overcome the 
Pamir Mountains.  
VI. 
The fifth lesson learned from the experience with the historic “Silk Road”: 
The cultural discovery of “the other” has only just begun and it contains 
enormous potential to overcome “other-ness” stereotypes in both 
directions.  
 
25  Wang Yanfei, China should reduce restrictions on foreign capital, senior 
economists say, in: China Daily, September 25, 2017, p. 3. 
26  See: These Are the Five Biggest Tests Facing China’s Next Central Bank Chief, 
Bloomberg News, November 23, 2017, online at https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/ articles/2017-11-22/china-s-next-monetary-chief-will-face-to-do-list-topped-
by-debt. 
27  Ibid.  
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Since the first encounters of Chinese and Europeans along the Silk Road, 
the main feature of these encounters was more or less diplomatic and hence 
defined by distance. A sense of alien-ness was never overcome since Gan 
Ying was send by the Chinese Emperor to the Roman Empire in 98 D.C. 
and since a Roman merchant introduced himself 166 A.D. as envoy of 
Emperor Antoninus, Hadrian’s stepson overlooking the last peace period of 
the Roman Empire, to the Chinese Court. The respective “import” of 
external religions and their civilization and fabric continuously remained 
abridged, one-dimensional and incomplete, as a few examples show. 
Buddhism has arrived in China since the fourth century from India and 
soon generated impressive cultural expressions of highest standard (i.e. the 
Bingling Grottos near Lanzhou on the Yellow River or the Dunhuang 
Grottoes in Western Gansu province). It is surprising, however, that 
Buddhism never traveled to Europe. Wu Cheng’ens 16th century “The 
Journey to the West” one of the four classic novels of China, ended at the 
Pamir Mountains as if there was no further West. Islam entered both China 
(in Kashgar and Xian, then called Chang’an) and Europe in the 7th century, 
but remained somewhat alien and controversial in both regions to this day. 
In China, concern about secessionist aspirations in Xinjiang prevails. In 
Europe, Islam is critically perceived in the context of migration. Fear of 
Islamist terrorism is a common denominator both in China and in the EU. 
As for Christianity, it is surprising that the religion with the largest support 
around the globe has remained somewhat alien in China. In the meantime, 
more Chinese citizens are said to be baptized (estimated 100 mio) that there 
are members of the Communist Party (85 mio). 28  China has ongoing 
difficulties with the Vatican about fully normalized relations – Pope 
Francis not being the first Catholic pontiff waiting for an invitation to visit 
China. Underground churches in today’s China contrast with Marco Polo’s 
 
28  See Antonia Blumberg, Inside China’s Secret Churches: How Christians Practice 
Their Faith Under An Atheist Government, in: Huffington Post, October 17, 2014, 
online at: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/16/china-secret-churches_n_5 
997532.html; Wang Zhicheng, The miracle of conversions and baptism in China, 
in: AsiaNews.it, March 29, 2016, online at: http://www.asianews.it/news-en/The-
miracle-of-conversions-and-baptisms-in-China-37068.html. 
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experience: In his 13th century writings (“Il Milione”) he was surprised to 
openly find so many Nestorian Churches wherever he went in China.  
In turn, it is astonishing how slowly Confucius’ wisdom reached the West. 
Only in the second half of the 19th century, James Legge translated his “Li 
Ki” (Book of Rites) into English. In the meantime, “Confucius Institutes” 
promote his teachings – and their interpretation in contemporary China – 
around the world. More than in religious terms, the West finds its 
underlying political philosophy challenged by Confucian perspectives: The 
8th World Confucian Conference, held in Qufu in September 2017, 
discussed among other issues the theory of political meritocracy “as an 
alternative to democracy in the governance of a country”.29 
Many facts are reciprocally known about each other’s cultural history, 
religion, literature and the arts. Yet, what is it that we still do not know 
about each other and ourselves in relation to “the other”? For the past 2,000 
years interactions, let alone processes of inculturation remained structurally 
week in Chinese-European encounters. Could the new “Silk Road” be used 
to a more substantial people-to-people encounter and intercultural 
discovery? Can the “Belt and Road Initiative” become a two-way Silk-
Road beyond cultural exchange programs, Confucius Institutes and 
European Art Festivals? An intellectual Silk Road encounter has to dig 
deeper than at the level of formal exchange programs and the effort of 
translations. It would be an amazing contribution to cultural globalization, 
in fact to globality, if respect for each other and curiosity would 
substantially overcome the level of stereotypes prevalent today in the field 
of most cultural and intellectual discourses along the Silk Road.  
 
29  According to Zhang Zhao, Scholars: Confucianism offers modern-day, global 
solutions, in: China Daily, September 25, 2017, p. 12. 
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VII. 
The potential of the “Belt and Road Initiative” will remain untapped unless 
lessons learned from the past will be fully included in the contemporary 
agenda. In the past, efforts to instrumentalize “connectivity” for power 
purposes failed in both directions. Han farmers experienced this already in 
the 2nd century when they looked for alliances with the Yuezhi, the enemies 
of their enemy, the Xiongu nomads. Pope Innocence IV failed when he sent 
a delegation to the Mongol Court in the 13th century not only aimed to 
Christianize the Mongol Khan, but to form an alliance with him against the 
Muslims. Today, Europe and the West at large should study Xi Jingping’s 
idea of global network-based partnerships without prejudice. However, one 
should not be naïve: Contemporary power asymmetries, fragile states and 
security challenges will not disappear in the foreseeable future. Hence, 
power equations need to be taken into account in any realistic assessment 
of the reciprocal trust deficit along the new Silk Road. The past offers one 
other last lesson worth reflecting: Expeditions without clear objectives, 
without being rooted in domestic legitimacy and without fully embraced 
out of self-interest by possible partners will most likely fail as history 
teaches. Missionary bishops send by the Vatican tried to Christianize China 
in the 13th century. When the Jesuits arrived in China in the 16th century 
and 17th century, they were surprised to see how little was left of those 
efforts who had remained one-sided, unilateral and hence alien. The seven 
impressive Sea Expeditions under Admiral Zheng He in the 15th century 
opened China to the world. However, this unilateral approach to global 
inclusion abruptly stopped when the Ming dynasty turned inward again and 
closed China more or less from the outside world. These and other 
experiences are on the back of people’s mind – both in Chinese and Europe 
– when they resort to the “Belt and Road Initiative” as a driver of 
interaction, but also as an obstacle to an honest and viable partnership. 
Time will tell what will come out of the “Belt and Road Initiative” as 
game-changer in EU-China relations.  
For now, two facts are certain. First, since the revolutionary recognition of 
Deng Xiao Ping about the fundamental mistakes of the Chinese Communist 
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Party in the first thirty years of the People’s Republic, China has 
consistently opened up to the world. Its intention to contribute, but also to 
shape and develop the existing global order from within is legitimate. It is 
the logical and legitimate aspiration of a great people. Instead of simply 
responding with Western skepticism and mistrust, China’s opening to the 
world should be echoed by a much more pro-active and global view of the 
European Union, its policy-makers, institutions and societies. Second, in 
the meantime, China is contributing enormous resources to stability in the 
world. This is unprecedented in modern Chinese history. It comes with 
reciprocal learning processes but entails promising perspectives for global 
development. China’s engagement in Africa has been extended to the 
constructive support of the G20 effort (“Compact with Africa”) launched in 
July 2017 at the Hamburg Summit.30 Of all the five permanent member 
states of the UN Security Council, China claims to provide the largest 
contingent of peacekeepers to nine UN missions (2,609). 31  These 
developments do not mean that Chinese policies are not without flaw, 
contradictions or, at times, intransparent. But it has to be recognized that 
China is among the fastest learning communities on earth, also in its 
international performance. All in all the Western response to China should 
overcome a certain masochistic soul-searching about a declining West 
faced by a limitless rising China.   
The global future is no zero-sum game. To turn it into a win-win-win for 
the EU, China and the US as the three unquestionable pillars of global 
leadership, it is essential to take China seriously and to take it by its word. 
This is the best way forward for the European Union (and for the United 
states, too) to overcome fear, anxiety and mistrust and to advance a world 
order of shared responsibility. The more the New Silk Road can become a 
two way, reciprocal, trust- and rule- based Silk Road, the more it will serve 
the world at large and the citizen’s, societies and countries along its way.  
 
30  G20 Compact with Africa (2017), online at: https://www.compactwithafrica.org/ 
content/compactwithafrica/home.html. 
31  Xi gives boost to global security governance, in: China Daily, September 30, 2017, 
p. 5. 
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